Key findings of Operation Kenova Report relating to Stakeknife which was published today
Stakeknife was recruited as a British Army agent in the late 1970s and operated as such for over a decade into the 1990s.
Throughout this period, Stakeknife met his handlers on average once every seven or eight days.
The RUC Special Branch and MI5 knew of Stakeknife’s recruitment and identity from the outset and were supplied with his intelligence throughout, including reports disclosing his involvement in the abduction and interrogation of suspected agents who were then murdered by the IRA.
The further material disclosed late by MI5 in 2025 covered almost the entirety of the period of Stakeknife’s operation.
During an 18 month period at the start of his career as an agent, Stakeknife produced at least 377 intelligence reports and a total of 3,517 intelligence reports attributed to him were ultimately recovered by Kenova.
Further, in the period between the conclusion of the Stevens Inquiry in the early 2000s and the commencement of Operation Kenova in 2016, MOD destroyed original documents relating to Stakeknife including, for example, two files of “contact forms” which recorded meetings with his handlers.
At different points, both the RUC Special Branch and MI5 offered or sought to take over the running of Stakeknife from the Army.
Following the recruitment of Stakeknife, the Army established a dedicated sub-unit known as “the Rat Hole” specifically to deal with his handling and intelligence.
MI5 had a member of staff permanently located within “the Rat Hole” and a bespoke database known as “Bog Rat 3970” and “Osbourne” was established to process
Stakeknife’s intelligence, but no trace of it remains.
A number of Stakeknife’s Army handlers went on to work for MI5, including as the Assistant Secretary Political and Deputy Assistant Secretary Political supporting the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence – MI5’s main representative in the North and principal security adviser to the Northern Ireland Secretary.
MI5 was involved in tasking Stakeknife through his military handlers and it received debriefs on all his intelligence and was involved in discussions about his role, importance and use and, furthermore, it also supported his operation through the provision of specialist technical support.
Stakeknife’s Army handlers routinely massaged his ego, for example, telling him that if he stopped reporting “the loss would be felt throughout the intelligence world”.
The British Army also paid Stakeknife tens of thousands of pounds and helped him purchase a property; discussed ways he could obscure the ownership of his assets so as to protect them against potential future legal claims; and discussed the provision of a five or six figure sum to cover a pension or salary.
For a period towards the end of the 1980s, the British Army temporarily stopped sharing Stakeknife’s intelligence with the RUC because it suspected that the RUC had used it to identify someone suspected of murdering a police officer and that this could have compromised Stakeknife’s identity.
Early attempts to resettle Stakeknife were unsuccessful and he was eventually resettled in Great Britain in the mid-2000s in a detached property and with a car.
Stakeknife’s British Army handlers flew him out of Northern Ireland on military aircraft for holidays on two occasions when they knew he was wanted by the RUC for conspiracy to murder and false imprisonment.
Kenova prosecution files named Stakeknife as a suspect in connection with more than two dozen offences including allegations of conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to unlawfully imprison, conspiracy to kidnap, false imprisonment, unlawful wounding, grievous bodily harm and unlawful possession of firearms.
